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Abstract— Recently, Neural networks have seen a huge surge
in its adoption due to their ability to provide high accuracy on
various tasks. On the other hand, the existence of adversarial
examples have raised suspicions regarding the generalization
capabilities of neural networks. In this work, we focus on the
weight matrix learnt by the neural networks and hypothesize
that ill conditioned weight matrix is one of the contributing
factors in neural network’s susceptibility towards adversarial
examples. For ensuring that the learnt weight matrix’s condition
number remains sufficiently low, we suggest using orthogonal
regularizer. We show that this indeed helps in increasing the
adversarial accuracy on MNIST and F-MNIST datasets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning models have performed remarkably well
in several domains such as computer vision [20], [21],
[22], natural language processing [24], [25] and speech
recognition [23]. These models are able to achieve high
accuracy in various tasks and hence their recent popularity.
Due to their adoption in diverse fields, the robustness and
security of Deep Neural Networks becomes a major issue.
For the reliable application of Deep Neural Networks in the
domain of security, the robustness against adversarial attacks
must be well established. In recent work, it was shown that
Deep Neural Networks are highly vulnerable to adversarial
attacks [15]. The adversarial attacks are hand-crafted inputs
on which the neural network behaves abnormally. Generally,
in these kind of attacks a small magnitude of calculated noise
is added to an input instance of training data to make the
model output a significantly different result had it been on the
unaltered input instance. In the case of images, some of the
perturbations are so subtle that the adversarial and original
training images are humanly indistinguishable. The existence
of adversarial examples compels one to think about the
generalization and learning capabilities of neural networks.
There had been several speculative explanation regarding
the existence of adversarial examples. Some of the expla-
nations attribute this to the non-linearity of deep neural
networks, but recently in [14] the authors showed that
linear behavior in high dimensional spaces is sufficient to
produce adversarial examples in neural networks. Our work
further builds upon this explanation by performing this linear
computation of neural networks in high dimension close
to a well conditioned space for increased stability against
malicious perturbations.
*These authors contributed equally
II. RELATED WORK
Various adversarial attacks and protection methods have
been proposed in the existing literature. Some of the well-
known attacks are the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
[14], Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [4], RAND+FGSM [17],
DeepFool [9], Black-Box Attack [4], [5], Jacobian-Based
Saliency Map Attack [16] and the L-BFGS Attack [15].
We are briefly going to describe some of the attacks that
were used in our experiments. In a neural network, let θ
denote its parameters, x be the input to the model from the
domain [0, 1]d, y be the true output label/value for input x
and J(θ, x, y) be the cost function.
A. Fast Gradient Sign Method
In the FGSM attack [14] the adversarial example is
constructed by using:
xadv = x+ sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y))
Here, xadv is the adversarial example generated using input x
and  is the variable reflecting the magnitude of perturbation
that is being introduced while constructing the adversarial
example. Some of the adversarial images generated from
MNIST dataset using this attack for different  values are
shown in Fig 1.
B. Basic Iterative Method
The BIM [4] is an extension of FGSM where adversarial
examples are crafted by applying FGSM multiple times with
small step size(α). Clipping of pixel values of intermedi-
ate results is done to ensure that each pixel perturbation
magnitude doesn’t exceed . Here, n denotes the number of
iterations to be applied.
xadv0 = x
xadvn+1 = Clipx,{xadvn + αsign(∇xJ(θ, xadvn , y))}
C. RAND+FGSM
The RAND+FGSM [17] is a modification of FGSM where
the FGSM is applied on the data point x
′
which is obtained
by adding a small random perturbation of step size α to the
original data point x.
x
′
= x+ αsign(N ((0d, Id)))
xadv = x
′
+ (− α)sign(∇x′J(θ, x
′
, y))
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(a) Original
(b)  = 0.1
(c)  = 0.2
(d)  = 0.3
Fig. 1: (a) Original test sample images which the network
correctly classifies. (b), (c) ,(d) represents a sample of the
corresponding adversarial images generated via FGSM for
different  values. For  taking values 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3,
the model mis-classifies 1, 4 and 5 of the above images
respectively.
D. Practical Black-Box Attack
Black-box attacks [4], [5] doesn’t require any prior
information regarding the structure of architecture or the
parameters learnt by the target model. As the name suggests
only the labels corresponding to inputs are required to
construct the adversarial examples. These attacks are based
on the premise of transferability of adversarial examples
between different architectures of deep neural network
trained on the same data [14], [15]. One of the black-box
attacks [5] comprises of training a local substitute model to
simulate the target model. In this approach it is assumed
that the attacker has a small set of inputs which were drawn
from the same input distribution as that of the training data
used for the target model. The training data of substitute
model consists of synthetically generated data using the
given small set of inputs. The labels for this training
data is obtained by querying the target model. A sample
of adversarial generated examples of F-Mnist dataset for
different  values are shown in Fig 2.
As the types of adversarial attacks are increasing in
number, so are the defensive techniques to protect deep
learning models. Yet there is no general defense mechanism
which guarantees robustness against all of the existing at-
tacks. Some of these adversarial defense techniques include
ideas such as training on adversarial examples [14], using
ensemble models [1], [17], adding entropy regularizer on the
output probabilities [6] and distillation [7].
The property of orthogonality has a huge appeal in
mathematical operations due to the inherent stability that
comes with it. Random orthogonal initial condition on weight
(a) Original
(b)  = 0.05
(c)  = 0.1
(d)  = 0.15
Fig. 2: (a) Original test sample images which the network
correctly classifies. (b), (c) ,(d) represent a sample of the
corresponding adversarial images for different  values gen-
erated via the black box attack.
matrices in neural networks has been shown to retain finite
learning speed even in case of deep neural architecture [18].
Furthermore, retaining this orthogonal property of weight
matrix have helped in fixing the problem of exploding and
vanishing gradients, particularly in case of Recurrent Neural
Networks enabling them to learn long term dependencies
[12], [10], [11]. In order to learn rich internal representa-
tion autoencoders have been used with a regularizer that
encourage the hidden layers to learn orthogonal represen-
tation of input [2]. In domain adaptation techniques, some
improvements were made by learning dissimilar private and
shared representation. It was obtained by enforcing soft or-
thogonality optimization constraints on the private and shared
representations [3]. Therefore, orthogonality constraints have
been used for an array of tasks which span from learning
rich representation in latent space to fixing the problem of
exploding and vanishing gradients. We will see that it also
has utility in facilitating reduction of condition number of
neural network’s weight space in adversarial setting.
III. THEORY
Condition number of a matrix or linear system [26]
measures the sensitivity of the matrix’s operation in the
event of introducing perturbation to inputs or the resulting
value. Condition number is a norm dependent property and
in this paper we will focusing on 2-norm. Orthogonal matrix
have a condition number of 1 whereas singular matrix have
infinitely large condition number.
Matrices that have condition number close to that 1 are
said to be “well-conditioned” and those which are close to
singular matrix(i.e. have large condition number) are said to
be “ill-conditioned”. Condition number of a matrix is also
representative of its sensitivity in inverse computation
The condition number of a Matrix A is defined as:
κ(A) = ||A||.||A−1|| (1)
where norm of the matrix is defined by
||A|| = max
x6=0
||Ax||
||x||
Consider a system of linear equation.
Ax = b (2)
The effect of the perturbation in x and b can be described
by using condition number of A.
A(x+ δx) = b+ δb (3)
||δx||
||x|| ≤ κ(A)
||δb||
||b|| (4)
We can use this analysis to consider the case of a fully
connected layer in neural network. As the intermediate
computations consists of linear equations:
Wx+ b = p (5)
where W is the weight matrix, b are the biases, x is the input
signal and p is the output before passing it through activation
layer.
Combining b and p to get :
Wx = b1 => W
−1b1 = x (6)
As the condition number a matrix and its inverse is the
same, given any perturbation in x, b1, using (2) and (4) we
can write :
||δb1||
||b1|| ≤ κ(W )
||δx||
||x|| (7)
As adversarial examples are malicious perturbation added
to the input (x) of the model, improving the condition
number of the weight space (κ(W )) limits the changes in
the intermediate-output (b1), which can seen from (7).
Similarly, this can be extended to convolutional neural
networks by focusing on the condition number of the matrix
formed where each row denotes the filter’s weight optimized
by the neural network. For example, in a particular convo-
lutional neural network with parameters (Kx,Ky, Cin, Nf )
where
• Kx - is the x-dimension of the filter
• Ky - is the y-dimension of the filter
• Cin - is the number of input channels of the input image
• Nf - is the number of filters used in the model
One can visual these learnable parameters of network as a
matrix having dimension ((Kx ×Ky ×Cin), Nf ) and carry
out the same analysis as done earlier in the case of fully
connected layer.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
As we have seen in the previous section, condition number
of the weight matrix can play an important role in deciding
the amount of change observed in the intermediate layer’s
output while dealing with perturbed input. Hence an effort in
reducing the condition number of weight space of the neu-
ral network should consequently increase neural network’s
robustness in adversarial setting. To achieve our goal of
pushing the weights towards well-conditioned space, we pro-
pose using orthogonal regularizer as a heuristic inspired from
the fact that orthogonal matrices have the ideal condition
number. While training we propose adding an extra loss
reflecting the penalty for ill-conditioned weight denoted by
Lcond = λ(W
T .W − I)
Here W is the l2-normalized weight matrix for a particular
layer of neural network, λ is the condition loss regularization
hyperparameter and I is the identity matrix of suitable
dimension. So for a classification task the total loss to be
optimized becomes:
Ltotal = Lclassification + Lcond
This Lcond is different for each layer and can be applied
over all the layers of neural network with different settings
of λ as required.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
To understand the effectiveness of our approach we con-
sider two different types of adversarial attacks that are used
for neural networks :-
• White box attacks - Here the attacker has the complete
knowledge of the model architecture that was used for
training as well as the data with which the model was
trained. The attacker can then use the same model
architecture and training data to train the model and
then generate adversarial examples .
• Black box attacks - Here the attacker has no knowledge
of the model architecture used to train for the desired
task. It also does not have access to the data used for
training. To generate adversarial examples the attacker
thus needs to train a substitute network and generate its
own data. The attacker can however query the actual
model to get the labels corresponding to the generated
training set.
We evaluated our approach on the FGSM, RAND+FGSM
and BIM white box attacks as well as FGSM black box
attack. In order to verify if our approach can be applied
along with approaches that aim to minimize the risk of
adversarial attack, we applied our method on adversarial
training and evaluated the results.
We conducted all our experiments on two different datasets
: the MNIST handwritten dataset and the Fashion-MNIST
clothing related dataset[19]. Both the datasets consist of
60,000 training images and 10,000 test images. The images
are gray-scale of size 28×28 . For all the white box exper-
iments we generated adversarial examples from the test set
consisting of 10k images.
A. Results on white box attacks
In this section we present results on white box attacks
using three different methods :- FGSM, RAND+FGSM and
BIM.
1) FGSM attack: We tested our approach on the
following two neural network architectures:-
• A convolutional neural network(A) with 2 convolutional
layers and 2 fully connected layers(dropout layer after
1st fc layer is also present) with ReLU activations. Max
pooling(2×2 pool size and a 2×2 stride) was applied
after every conv layer. The CNN layer weights were of
shape [5, 5, 1, 32] and [5, 5, 32, 64] respectively and
the fc layer were of sizes [3136, 1024] and [1024, 10].
• A fully connected neural network(B) with 2 hidden
units each consisting of 256 hidden units and ReLU
activation.
We also trained the network using adversarial training( =
0.3) and further applied our approach on top of it to check
if our method can be used on top of other methods for
preventing adversarial attack or not.
The regularization parameter(λ) used in our approach for
each of the different layers was selected on the basis of
observing the condition number of each layer by observing
orthogonal regularization loss during training. Layers having
higher condition numbers were assigned larger values of λ
compared to those having low condition numbers. We stress
here that the hyperparameter λ was chosen not on the basis
of the adversarial accuracy of the model on the test set
but rather on the basis of condition numbers of layers and
the validation set classification accuracy. We need to take
into consideration the validation set classification accuracy
because larger values of λ lead to reduction in accuracy.
We tested the FGSM attack over MNIST dataset for
different values of  and the results are shown in tables I
and III for the two network architectures. As can be in-
ferred from the results our approach improves the adversarial
accuracy under both the cases :- when directly applied as
a regularizer and when applied as a regularizer over the
adversarial training approach. The second result is interesting
because it suggests the possibility of further improvement
when our method is augmented with other techniques that
have been proposed to improve adversarial accuracy. We
have not shown the performance of network B for high values
of  because the performance of the network becomes already
very bad even at  = 1.5 for adversarial examples.
Similar experiments were performed over the F-MNIST
dataset for the two different network architectures and the
results have been shown in tables II and IV. We see that
under normal training the adversarial accuracy drops very
low for high values of  and our approach also does not
TABLE I: Adversarial accuracy for FGSM attack over
MNIST dataset for Network A
 Normal Regz. Adv. tr. Adv. tr.+Regz.
0.05 0.9486 0.9643 0.9752 0.9768
0.1 0.7912 0.8759 0.9527 0.9656
0.15 0.4804 0.6753 0.9352 0.9678
0.2 0.1903 0.3847 0.9212 0.9741
0.25 0.058 0.1484 0.9008 0.9787
0.3 0.0238 0.0276 0.8729 0.979
TABLE II: Adversarial accuracy for FGSM attack over F-
MNIST dataset for Network A
 Normal Regz. Adv. tr. Adv. tr.+Regz.
0.05 0.5013 0.5559 0.7728 0.7713
0.1 0.2128 0.274 0.6926 0.7073
0.15 0.0658 0.1007 0.6261 0.6535
0.2 0.01 0.0227 0.5564 0.5862
0.25 0.0026 0.0022 0.4763 0.5071
0.3 0.0004 0.0003 0.4153 0.4454
improve the accuracy under these settings.
TABLE III: Adversarial accuracy for FGSM attack over
MNIST dataset for Network B
 Normal Regz. Adv. tr. Adv. tr.+Regz.
0.025 0.8895 0.9194 0.9387 0.9449
0.05 0.5819 0.7256 0.8345 0.8612
0.075 0.237 0.3872 0.6063 0.6903
0.1 0.0731 0.1603 0.3362 0.4446
0.125 0.032 0.0539 0.1527 0.2254
0.15 0.0198 0.017 0.0689 0.0998
TABLE IV: Adversarial accuracy for FGSM attack over F-
MNIST dataset for Network B
 Normal Regz. Adv. tr. Adv. tr.+Regz.
0.025 0.5459 0.5844 0.7592 0.7521
0.05 0.225 0.2928 0.5816 0.597
0.075 0.0787 0.1088 0.3994 0.4398
0.1 0.0295 0.0319 0.236 0.2875
0.125 0.0114 0.005 0.1285 0.1751
0.15 0.0041 0.0008 0.0613 0.0897
We have shown maximum of the condition number of
different layers in network in table V. The condition number
of the layers were calculated via the matrix 2 norm. As can
be seen from the table, adding the loss corresponding to
orthogonality of the weights does indeed reduce the condition
number of the weight matrices.
To see how our approach affects the test accuracy of
the network, we have shown the result in table VI. As
can be seen from the table, our method does not much
affect the test accuracy for both the two datasets. The
same is true even when the approach is applied on top
of adversarial training method. Thus we can say that
our method does improve the adversarial performance of
TABLE V: Max condition number of network weights
Dataset Net Normal Regz. Adv.tr. Adv.tr.+Regz.
MNIST A 17.56 3.73 121.78 23.49B 995.70 251.19 1192.47 14.88
F-MNIST A 15.94 5.63 114.30 23.14B 513.33 49.01 875.87 26.48
the networks without any compromise with the test accuracy.
TABLE VI: Test Accuracy of networks under different
settings
Dataset Net Normal Regz. Adv.tr. Adv.tr.+Regz.
MNIST A 0.9916 0.9916 0.9917 0.9907B 0.9777 0.9789 0.9803 0.979
F-MNIST A 0.9038 0.9016 0.8892 0.8852B 0.8898 0.8847 0.8841 0.8814
2) RAND+FGSM and BIM attack: For the
RAND+FGSM attack a Gaussian noise was added to
the examples before subjecting them to the FGSM attack.
The value of α was kept to be 0.5 and experiments were
conducted for the two datasets for different  values. The
results have been shown in table VII.
TABLE VII: Adversarial accuracy for RAND+FGSM for
Network A
Dataset  Normal Regz.
MNIST
0.05 0.9911 0.9915
0.1 0.9411 0.9587
0.15 0.7582 0.8536
0.2 0.4171 0.6183
0.25 0.1333 0.3186
0.3 0.0379 0.0983
F-MNIST
0.05 0.896 0.8944
0.1 0.4686 0.5223
0.15 0.1879 0.2417
0.2 0.05 0.0805
0.25 0.0065 00.0135
0.3 0.0017 0.0008
For the BIM attack α was kept to be 0.025 and the value
of n was 2, 3, 6, 9 corresponding to the different  values.The
results for the experiment have been shown in table VIII.
The results show that our method makes the network be
robust to all the three different types of adversarial attack
without affecting the test accuracy performance of network.
B. Results on black box attacks
For the black box attack we created a substitute network
with the following architecture:-
A fully connected neural network(C) with 2 hidden units
each consisting of 200 hidden units and ReLU activation.
The substitute network had access to only 150 test samples
initially and new data was augmented to it for n = 6 times
via the Jacobian based data augmentation technique. Network
A was used as the classifier for this attack. Adversarial
TABLE VIII: Adversarial accuracy for BIM for Network A
Dataset  Normal Regz.
MNIST
0.025 0.9433 0.9622
0.05 0.8575 0.9173
0.1 0.2047 0.4635
0.15 0.007 0.0322
F-MNIST
0.025 0.4737 0.5287
0.05 0.2816 0.343
0.1 0.0172 0.0306
0.15 0 0.0001
examples were generated using the trained substitute network
which were then subsequently fed for classification to the
original classifier.
The results over the generated adversarial samples are
shown in table IX for the two datasets MNIST and F-
MNIST. As can be seen from the results, our approach does
improve the performance of the network over adversarial ex-
amples generated from the substitute network across different
values of  for both the datasets.
TABLE IX: Adversarial accuracy under Black Box attack
Dataset  Normal Regz.
MNIST
0.05 0.9879 0.9887
0.1 0.9817 0.984
0.15 0.9686 0.9765
0.2 0.9481 0.9624
0.25 0.9076 0.9359
0.3 0.8256 0.8752
F-MNIST
0.05 0.8565 0.8667
0.1 0.7858 0.8161
0.15 0.6924 0.7456
0.2 0.577 0.6453
0.25 0.459 0.5328
0.3 0.3505 0.4319
VI. DISCUSSION
In the previous section we showed results as to how
reducing the condition number of weight matrices via
forcing them to align orthogonally helped in performance
over adversarial examples. In this section we try to see
some other issues that a network could face as a result of
high condition number in the it’s layers.
The condition number of a matrix in the case of 2-
norm becomes the ratio of largest to smallest singular value.
Consider a square matrix A of n dimension having the
singular value decomposition (SVD) [27] as A = UΣV T .
Rewriting the SVD of A as a combination of n equations
where i ∈ {1, 2, .., n} we have:
Avi = σiui (8)
κ(A) =
σ1
σn
(9)
If the matrix is ill-conditioned then one of the following is
the case: either σ1 is high or σn is low or both. From (8) and
(a) Original (b) Unclipped perturbed (c) Clipped perturbed
Fig. 3: (a) Original test sample image of class 0 which the
network correctly classifies with high confidence of 0.999
(b) represents the unclipped perturbed test sample image
in the direction of minimum eigenvector with λ = 20 as
mentioned in (10). The confidence of classification for class
0 for the original and regularized classifiers were 0.999
and 0.105 respectively.(c) represents the clipped(between
0 and 1) perturbed test sample image generated with the
same configuration as that of (b). For (c) the confidence
of classification for class 0 in case the of original and
regularized classifier were 0.916 and 0.454 respectively.
(9), we can observe by perturbing the input in the direction of
vn and applying it to A produces least amount of change in
output. In fact vn forms the least square solution of Ax = 0.
Hence, in an ill-conditioned weight matrix of neural network
with sufficiently low value of σn, perturbing the input in the
direction of right singular vector vn will produce minimum
change magnitude-wise when applied over matrix.
A(x+ λvn) = Ax+ λ(σnun) (10)
Leveraging this observation in a fully connected neural net-
work, we generated data points which were significantly dif-
ferent from the original data point taken from Mnist dataset
by keeping a reasonably high value of λ. The model was still
predicting it to be of the same class as that of the original
data point. These artificially generated data points can be
thought of as another type of adversarial examples which
are visibly different from the original data points but the
models labels them the same with high confidence. Examples
of the generated examples along with their predictions can
be seen in Fig 3. In the same architecture of fully connected
network with condition number penalty applied, significant
drop in the confidence of labelling was observed. Hence,
we can say that more sensible results are generated when
models are regularized while keeping condition number of
the weight in check.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTION
In this paper we have explored the relationship between
the condition number of the weights learnt by neural network
and it’s vulnerability towards adversarial examples. We have
shown theoretically that well-conditioned weight space of
neural networks are relativity less prone to be fooled by
adversarial examples by the means of inferring bounds on
change in output with respect to input in neural layers. We
have validated our theory on various adversarial techniques
and datasets. One of the heuristics that was used to control
the condition number of weight space was orthogonal regu-
larizer, but any other approach that influences the condition
number in the positive light should also work. Application
of the proposed technique should help in creating more
robust neural networks specially in security related fields. In
future work, we would like to explore adversarial generation
techniques and feasibility of preconditioning in context of
neural networks.
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